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Towards a Formalism for Conservative Claims about the 
Dependability of Software-based Systems 
 
Peter Bishop, Robin Bloomfield, Bev Littlewood∗, Andrey Povyakalo, David Wright 
Centre for Software Reliability, City Unversity, London EC1V 0HB 
Abstract 
In recent work we have argued for a formal treatment of confidence about the claims 
made in dependability cases for software-based systems. The key idea underlying this 
work is ‘the inevitability of uncertainty’: it is rarely possible to assert that a claim about 
safety or reliability is true with certainty. Much of this uncertainty is epistemic in nature, 
so it seems inevitable that expert judgment will continue to play an important role in 
dependability cases. Here we consider a simple case where an expert makes a claim about 
the probability of failure on demand (pfd) of a sub-system of a wider system, and is able 
to express his confidence about that claim probabilistically. An important, but difficult, 
problem then is how such sub-system (claim, confidence) pairs can be propagated 
through a dependability case for a wider system, of which the sub-systems are 
components. An informal way forward is to justify, at high confidence, a strong claim, 
and then conservatively only claim something much weaker: “I’m 99% confident that the 
pfd is less than 10-5, so it’s reasonable to be 100% confident that it is less than 10-3.” 
These conservative pfds of sub-systems can then be propagated simply through the 
dependability case of the wider system. In this paper we provide formal support for such 
reasoning. 
 
KEY WORDS: Safety case; system safety; epistemic uncertainty; software reliability; 
Bayesian probability; confidence measure. 
 
1  Background 
There is now a huge literature on the assessment of the dependability of software-based 
systems, going back several decades. In recent years the assessment process has started to 
be formalized in dependability cases, most notably safety cases: see, for example (Bishop 
and Bloomfield 1995; Bloomfield, Bishop et al. 1998; Penny, Eaton et al. 2001; Gorski 
2004; Kelly and Weaver 2004). There are now safety standards that require safety cases, 
e.g. (CAA 2001; MoD 2007) 
In this paper we shall discuss some problems arising from the need to assess uncertainty 
in cases where dependability claims about a software component form part of a wider 
system case. We believe that some aspects of uncertainty have been long neglected or 
misjudged. For example, expert judgments about the impact of the “quality” of software 
development processes upon the dependability of software systems often underestimate 
the uncertainties involved. In recent work we have proposed a formal quantitative 
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treatment of ‘confidence’ to address this omission (Bloomfield and Littlewood 2003; 
Bloomfield and Littlewood 2007; Littlewood and Wright 2007). 
Computer scientists, including software engineers, have long had an uneasy relationship 
with uncertainty, and with its most powerful calculus, probability. Some of us can 
remember discussions of thirty years ago about software reliability. It was difficult then 
to persuade some software experts that there was inherent uncertainty in the failure 
processes of programs, and that probability was the appropriate way of capturing this 
uncertainty. Instead, it was asserted that software failed systematically, and thus that 
probabilistic notions of ‘reliability’ were meaningless. 
Over the years the position has changed. It is now widely agreed that ‘systematic failure’ 
just means that a program that has failed in certain circumstances will always fail 
whenever those circumstances are exactly repeated. The uncertainty lies in our not 
knowing beforehand which circumstances (e.g. inputs to a program) will cause failure, 
and when these will arise during the operational execution of the program. It is this 
uncertainty that is represented in a probabilistic measure of dependability, such as 
probability of failure on demand (pfd). 
The uncertainty discussed above concerns system behaviour – it is ‘uncertainty-in-the-
world’. In the jargon, this is called aleatory uncertainty. There is another form of 
uncertainty that has, we believe, been neglected by the software engineering community: 
this is uncertainty in the dependability assessment process itself. This is called epistemic 
uncertainty, and it concerns uncertainty in our ‘beliefs-about-the-world’ (Oberkampf and 
Helton 2004).  
The presence of epistemic uncertainty means that we cannot be certain that a claim about 
dependability – e.g. the pfd is smaller than 10-3 – is true. We might reasonably expect that 
by collecting more supportive evidence, we would increase our confidence in the truth of 
the claim, but it will rarely be possible to collect sufficient evidence to eliminate doubt 
completely.1 This prompts questions such as: How confident are we that the claim is true? 
How do we express ‘confidence’ quantitatively? How do we incorporate this ‘assessment 
uncertainty’ into wider dependability cases, and into decision-making? 
Consider the simple example of operational testing of an on-demand software-based 
system. It is put on test and survives 4602 demands without failure. It is a simple 
statistical exercise (Parnas, Schowan et al. 1990; Littlewood and Wright 1997) to show 
that you can claim the pfd is smaller than 10-3 with 99% confidence (there is only a 0.01 
probability that the pfd is greater than 10-3). The assumptions here include: the oracle is 
perfect (i.e. it reports failure if and only if there truly is a failure); the test cases are 
generated in a way that accurately represents the operational environment (i.e. each is 
selected with the same probability as in operational use). 
If the assumptions are correct in this example, the only epistemic uncertainty arises from 
the extensiveness of the evidence; if we were to see more failure-free demands, we would 
have greater than 99% confidence in the claim. When the only epistemic uncertainty is 
the extensiveness of the evidence, as here, it is easy to compute its impact upon 
                                                
1  One exception might be exhaustive testing in some specialized situations. Such exceptions are, we believe, very 
rare. 
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confidence: for any particular number of failure-free demands it is a simple matter to 
compute how much confidence we should have in the pfd claim of 10-3. 
In practice, of course, the assessor would not be certain the assumptions were true, and 
this extra epistemic uncertainty would reduce his confidence in the dependability claim. 
The impact of assumption doubt upon confidence in a claim is generally harder to 
quantify, and is likely to involve expert judgment. See (Littlewood and Wright 2007) for 
a more complex example in which a Bayesian Belief Net is used to structure an argument 
involving different kinds of assumption doubt. There has been extensive research in 
recent years on methods for elicitation of expert beliefs to populate such arguments – see 
(Cooke 2008) for a recent survey – but this remains a difficult area. 
The difficulties involved in incorporating software dependability assessment into 
quantitative safety cases for wider systems, of which the software can be regarded as a 
component, are well illustrated by the licensing process for the Sizewell B nuclear reactor 
in the UK in the early 1990s. There was extensive discussion – much of it in the public 
domain – about the reliability of the software in the primary protection system (PPS). The 
original reliability requirement for this system was a pfd no worse than 10-4. However it 
soon became apparent that nuclear industry experts could not come to a consensus that 
the evidence (quality of production process, testing and static analysis of the delivered 
product, etc) was strong enough to support the 10-4 claim with sufficiently high 
confidence. 
The safety system of Sizewell B comprises the software-based PPS and a simpler 
hardware secondary protection system (SPS) in a 1-out-of-2 architecture (Hunns and 
Wainwright 1991). When the PPS claim turned out not to be supportable with sufficient 
confidence, an extensive review of the wider plant safety case was made, including what 
could be claimed for the SPS. This showed that the contribution of the overall safety 
system to the plant safety case would be satisfied if 10-3 could be claimed for the PPS 
(partly because a stronger claim could be made for the SPS).  
Using qualitative evidence such as the quality of the production process and extensive 
static analysis, the regulators accepted that the system was adequately safe based on this 
revised figure2. Some time later, and following the licensing of the reactor for operation, 
the PPS software was subjected to extensive statistically representative operational 
testing. This direct evaluation of its reliability supported the claim of 10-3 pfd at a high 
confidence level (May, Hughes et al. 1995). 
After the licensing of Sizewell B, the UK’s Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (ACSNI) set up a Study Group on the Safety of Operational Computer 
Systems, chaired by one of the authors of this paper. Among the recommendations in the 
final published version of the report (HSE 1998) was the following: 
 Confidence in assessments of software-based systems is usually less than for 
more conventionally engineered systems. We believe that attention should 
be given to incorporating formally in licensees’ and regulatory guidance a 
                                                
2  This summary simplifies the detailed argument that takes into account the frequency of the different initiating 
events that the SPS and PPS protect against, and the scope of the PPS and SPS safety functions. The SPS is 
simpler in both the technology it uses and also in the scope of the functions it performs. 
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recognition of the importance of the level of confidence that can be placed in 
assessments of risk within the concept of an ‘adequate’ safety case. What is 
needed is to clarify and define the notion of ‘adequacy’, such that it can be 
used to guide and justify decisions as to the required extent of activities that 
will establish the level of confidence that can be placed in a risk assessment. 
During the Study Group’s discussions it was suggested that the UK principle of ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) – referring to the required safety level (such as pfd) 
– should be accompanied by a similar one concerning confidence in that level having 
been achieved: ‘ACARP’ (As Confident As Reasonably Practicable). At the time of 
writing, this suggestion of a formal demonstration of confidence has not been taken up. 
However, the experiences from Sizewell and subsequent assessments have been codified 
in the UK nuclear industry’s reissued Safety Assessment Principles (HSE 2006). These 
explicitly require confidence building: 
 
361  Independent ‘confidence-building’ should provide an independent and 
thorough assessment of a safety system’s fitness for purpose. This comprises 
the following elements:  
a) Complete and preferably diverse checking of the finally validated 
production software by a team that is independent of the systems suppliers, 
including:  
• independent product checking providing a searching analysis of the 
product;  
• independent checking of the design and production process, including 
activities needed to confirm the realisation of the design intention; and  
b) Independent assessment of the test programme, covering the full scope of 
test activities.  
362  Should weaknesses be identified in the production process, compensating 
measures should be applied to address these. The type of compensating 
measures will depend on, and should be targeted at, the specific weaknesses 
found. 
 
Standards are generally silent on the question of confidence. For example, IEC61508 
(IEC 2000) has nothing to say about the confidence that can be placed in the probability 
levels (or rates) associated with SILs. Whilst more extensive and demanding evidence is 
needed to support the higher level SILs, there is no guidance on how much evidential 
support is needed to provide a particular confidence that a system lies in a certain SIL. 
On the other hand, ten years ago UK Def Stan 00-56 (MoD 1996) informally 
acknowledged the inportance of confidence – for example it recommended the use of a 
diverse two-legged argument to increase confidence in a dependability claim – but, again, 
it contained no guidance on issues concerning ‘how much’ confidence can be claimed in 
particular instances. More recently Issue 4 of the Def Stan (MoD 2007) explicitly 
discusses the role of confidence and provides some guidance, albeit qualitative, on how 
to interpret high, medium and low levels of confidence. 
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The need to address confidence explicitly in the HSE safety assessment principles, and 
the experience with the discussions about the PPS reliability (where the notion of 
confidence had been treated rather informally), suggest there may be advantages in 
exploring more formal – and ideally quantitative – models of confidence. These more 
formal approaches could provide a semantics for understanding and communicating 
‘confidence’, and provide a rigorous framework for negotiation during the licensing 
process. 
An important goal of such a formalism would be to provide a clear notion of how 
confident an assessor is, or needs to be. In the Sizewell example there were no clear 
answers to questions of the following kind: 
• How confident was the assessor in the eventually-accepted 10-3 for the pfd of the 
PPS? 
• How confident did the regulator need to be, so as to ‘sign off’ on this part of the 
safety case? 
• How confident was the assessor in the original requirement of 10-4, and how much 
did this confidence fall short of what was needed? 
In order that an assessor’s epistemic doubt be included in the overall risk assessment, it is 
necessary that these questions be answered quantitatively in terms of the assessor’s 
subjective probabilities. 
In the Sizewell example, it was also not clear how a pfd level, and the professed 
confidence in that level, was used:  
• If the assessor, or regulator, were ‘sufficiently’ confident in 10-3, how would this 
number be used? 
• Does ‘sufficiently confident’ mean ‘I can treat the number as if it were true’? 
• If, instead, ‘sufficiently confident’ means something like 99% confident, then 
how is the residual 1% (i.e. the chance that the system is worse than the 10-3 
claim) treated? 
At one stage there seemed to be reasoning along the following lines: ‘We are reasonably 
confident that the pfd is better than 10-4; to be on the safe side, however, we shall only 
claim 10-3, and this is so conservative that we can treat this figure as the true pfd in our 
calculations for the wider system (plant) safety case.’ In this paper we investigate 
whether this kind of reasoning can ever be justified, and if so whether the resulting 
numbers can make it a useful approach. 
It was interesting in the case of the Sizewell PPS that the numbers involved were rather 
modest. It seemed possible, in principle, for quite high confidence to be placed in these 
required levels of reliability. This contrasts with other industries, where the required 
levels seem so demanding that it will never be feasible to assert high confidence in them 
convincingly (Butler and Finelli 1993; Littlewood and Strigini 1993). An obvious 
example concerns the controversial requirement of 10-9 probability of failure per hour for 
particular flight-critical avionics systems in commercial airplanes: how much confidence 
in such a claim should a regulator place, based for example upon evidence of adherence 
to the guidelines in (RTCA 1992)? This is far from the most extreme example we have 
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seen. Some railway signaling applications apparently require failure rates no worse than 
10-12 per hour (Guiho and Hennebert 1990).  
Coming now to a safety case for a wider system – nuclear plant, commercial aircraft type 
– the top level claim for this system might be expressed, for example, as a probability of 
(safety-related) failure on demand, or failure rate. This claim will in turn depend upon 
claims made at lower levels about sub-system functions: e.g. pfd of a protection system, 
e.g. failure rate of a flight control system. If we knew the values of these sub-system 
parameters with certainty, then in principle we could decide whether the claim required 
of the sub-system by the wider safety case had been satisfied. If, on the other hand, these 
parameters are not known with certainty, as seems likely, then these uncertainties need to 
be propagated through the safety case, and the reasoning becomes more difficult. In the 
remainder of the paper it is this problem that we address, when the claims at sub-system 
level concern software. We are not aware that such problems have been addressed 
previously in the software engineering literature. 
2  Statement of problem, and a conservative solution 
As will be clear from the informal discussion above, human judgment inevitably forms an 
important element of any assessment of confidence (or its complement, doubt) when this 
arises from epistemic uncertainty. If, as we believe, confidence should be expressed 
probabilistically, the appropriate calculus of probability is a subjective Bayesian one.  
The first problem in any Bayesian analysis is to obtain the prior beliefs of the expert. 
Consider an example in which a pfd is the subject of the dependability claim. This pfd 
can be regarded as an unknown number that characterizes the aleatory uncertainty 
discussed above. In principle, we could estimate this number to any degree of accuracy if 
we were in the fortunate position of being able to generate unlimited numbers of 
statistically representative test cases, and we had a perfect oracle to decide whether each 
test case had been executed correctly. In practice, of course, we are never in this position: 
instead, there is uncertainty about the value of the pfd. This is the epistemic uncertainty 
discussed above, arising from imperfect knowledge, etc. This uncertainty about the true 
value of this pfd requires it to be treated as a random variable, P, so that confidence is 
expressed as a probability. Thus the expert may believe a priori that 
! 
Prob(P " y) =1# x         (1) 
expressing his confidence, 1–x, that the pfd is smaller than y. If the expert were able to 
tell us the values of x corresponding to all possible values of y, we would have a 
distribution, say F (with probability density function f), for the random variable P. This 
would describe the expert’s complete (epistemic) a priori uncertainty about the value of 
the pfd. In fact it is well-known that experts find it hard to describe their complete 
uncertainty in this way: it is even hard to elicit just one or two (y, x) pairs. 
The second problem concerns how we would use the information even if we knew f 
completely. Typically, such a claim (and its associated confidence) would be only one of 
several forming a dependability case. For example, this claim might concern only one 
sub-system among many others, or one among several functions of a wider system about 
which the top-level claim is being made. Propagating uncertainty about these many sub-
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system dependability claims (or dependability claims about many functions) through such 
complex cases can be difficult or even impossible. 
A very informal solution to this problem that we have seen uses the following reasoning: 
‘I wish to claim that the pfd of this component (or this function) is better than 10-3. I will 
attempt to collect sufficient evidence to be able to make a much stronger claim, e.g. pfd is 
smaller than 10-5, with high confidence. I will then conclude, because of my high 
confidence in this stronger claim, that the weaker claim is conservative (i.e. I am certain 
that the true pfd is better than this claim). I will then plug this conservative value into my 
calculation for the overall dependability of the wider system. I am confident that if I do 
this for all subsystems, my calculated claim for the system will be conservative’ 
Is such reasoning ever justified? There is an attractive conservatism in the approach. If 
the evidence is strong enough to replace the numbers in the previous paragraph by ones 
representing even stronger claims at even higher confidence, surely (it might be 
reasoned) eventually the expert will allow the modest claim of 10-3 to be treated as if it 
were true? 
In what follows we show that such an approach can be placed on a formal footing. But it 
turns out that the conservatism in the approach can be very unforgiving, at least until a 
priori beliefs are supplemented by extensive evidence of failure-free working. 
2.1 Result based only on prior beliefs 
We start with the very simple situation where the expert has only a priori beliefs about 
the pfd3. In fact, he is only willing – or able – to express the beliefs represented by (1) 
above for a single (y, x) pair. In other words, we only know one point on his belief-
distribution f. 
If we had the complete distribution, then the quantity of interest here is the expert’s 
subjective probability that there is failure on a randomly chosen demand: 
! 
Prob(failure on randomly selected demand) = p. f (p)dp
0
1
" = E(p)   (2) 
by the formula for total probability. This is, for example, the number that the expert 
might be prepared to ‘plug in’ to a wider safety case: it takes account of the expert’s 
complete aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. 
On the left of Figure 1 is a typical distribution for an expert’s belief. In reality, an expert 
is unlikely to be able to express the infinitely many probabilities implicit in this figure. 
Instead, he may only be willing to tell us about one point on the distribution: represented 
here by y. On the right is the most pessimistic of all possible distributions, f(p), that 
satisfy the expert’s (y,x) belief. It is obtained by placing the probability masses associated 
                                                
3  But note that such beliefs may arise from informally taking account of real evidence. The point here is that the 
expert is only prepared to tell us the beliefs, expressed as a (claim, confidence/doubt) pair, but not the reasons for 
his holding such beliefs. We shall later consider the case where, following the expression of these a priori beliefs, 
the expert obtains some evidence from operational tsting, and uses this to modify his beliefs, using Bayes’ 
theorem. 
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with the intervals (0,y), (y,1) at the extreme right of the intervals. Note that here the bars 
represent probability mass, in contrast to the probability density function on the left. 
 
 
             
Figure 1: A typical distribution for an expert’s belief, and the most pessimistic 
distribution that satisfies the expert’s (y,x) belief. 
 
 
The right hand diagram in Fig 1 can easily be seen to represent the ‘most pessimistic’ set 
of beliefs – i.e. distribution f(p) – that satisfies the expert’s professed belief, (1), because 
it is the distribution that maximizes (2), giving: 
! 
Prob(failure on randomly selected demand) = p. f (p)dp
0
1
"
= p. f (p)dp
0
y
" + p. f (p)dp
y
1
" < y(1# x)+ x = x + y# xy = y*,  say.
    (3) 
In other words, if the expert is prepared to accept a claim y with confidence 1-x, as (1) 
asserts, then (3) shows that he must believe the probability of failure on a randomly 
selected demand is smaller than y*=x+y-xy. That is, he can treat y* as the true probability 
of failure on demand – for example in a wider safety case – and be assured that this is a 
conservative number. 
Unfortunately, it is easy to see that this approach is very conservative when only a priori 
beliefs are considered, as here. For example, for 10-3 to be an upper bound on the expert’s 
(subjective) probability of failure on demand, he would need to have 99.91% confidence 
that the random variable, pfd, is smaller than 10-4. The problem lies in the exact symmetry 
of the roles of x and y in (3): any claim, y*, he makes with certainty must be numerically 
greater than the doubt, x, in the stronger claim, y. Note that this is true regardless of the 
value of y, but in realistic situations x will usually be much larger than y. 
This is, of course, disappointing, and means that the result is unlikely to be of practical 
interest. When evidence of successful operation is available, however, the picture 
changes for the better. 
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2.2 Result based on evidence of failure-free working 
It is interesting to ask what is the pessimistic (but attainable) bound for ‘probability of 
failure on a randomly selected demand’ when some failure-free operation4 has been seen 
(or, for that matter, some operation that might have included some failures5). 
When n failure-free demands have been observed, the expert’s beliefs about P change 
from his prior belief, represented by f(p), via Bayes theorem: his conditional distribution 
becomes 
! 
f (p | n failure - free demands) =
(1" p)n f (p)dp
(1" p)n f (p)dp
0
1
#
     (4) 
The expert’s posterior probability of failure on demand is just the mean of this: 
! 
Prob(system fails on randomly selected demand | n failure - free demands) =  
! 
p
0
1
" (1# p)n f (p)dp
(1# p)n f (p)dp
0
1
"
= E(p | n failure - free demands)      (5) 
Clearly, the ‘most pessimistic’ 2-point distribution above no longer applies – there cannot 
be positive probability mass at 1 following the observation of failure-free demands. So 
the question is: what is the most pessimistic f(p), still satisfying (1), which maximizes 
(5)? 
In fact, somewhat surprisingly, it can be shown that this is once again a 2-point 
distribution: see Appendix for proof. As before, it has probability mass (1-x) concentrated 
at y and probability mass x concentrated at z, where the value of z is chosen to maximise 
the posterior mean of P, which is, by substitution in (5): 
! 
y(1" y)
n
(1" x)+ z(1" z)
n
x
(1" y)
n
(1" x)+ (1" z)
n
x
= h(z),  say       (6) 
The value of z corresponding to the most pessimistic 2-point (y,z) distribution is the one 
in (0,1) satisfying h'(z)=0, i.e. satisfying 
! 
(1" z)
n+1
x
(n+1)z" ny"1
= (1" y)
n
(1" x)        (7) 
for n>0 (for n=0, h'(z)=x>0) 
Using this distribution in (5) we obtain the value of the probability of failure on a 
randomly selected demand that the expert can treat as ‘true’ (e.g. for a wider safety case), 
                                                
4  Such operation must, of course, be statistically representative of operational use, and the oracle used to determine 
that all demands are successful must be perfect. 
5  But which are not all failures, because then the 2-point distribution above will be the worst case one, with 
probability mass at 1. 
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and know that it is conservative (but attainable). It is easy to see from (6) that this ‘true’ 
pfd converges to y as n goes to infinity (with z converging to y), since (1-z)<(1-y). 
Table 1 shows some examples when the expert expresses his prior beliefs in terms of a 
claim of 0.5x10-3. Thus when he has a prior confidence of 99% that the pfd is smaller 
than 0.5x10-3 he can only claim 0.010495 with certainty before seeing any evidence of 
failure-free working. Such unforgiving results from Section 2.1, however, quickly 
become more useful as evidence of failure-free operation is gathered: with only 50 
failure-free demands, and the same prior belief, he can be certain the probability of 
failure on a randomly chosen demand is better than 0.000573. Compare this with 0.0005 
= 0.5x10-3 – his original claim in which he had a prior confidence of 0.99. As the 
evidence of failure-free working gets larger, the expert becomes closer and closer to 
certain that the original pfd claim is true (a priori, remember, he was only 99% confident 
in this claim). But the expert can never be certain of a stronger claim that his original 
0.5x10-3, however much evidence he sees of perfect working.  
 
 
          (1-x) 
n 
0.90 0.95 0.99 
0 0.10045          0.050475         0.010495 
1 0.026821         0.013316         0.003011 
5 0.007626         0.003951         0.001173 
10 0.004235         0.002307                 0.000852 
30 0.001787         0.001122         0.000621 
50 0.001278         0.000876         0.000573         
100 0.000891 0.000689 0.000537 
500 0.000578 0.000538 0.000507 
1000 0.000539 0.000519 0.000504 
 
Table 1. Examples of the worst case true probabilities of failure, based on an expert’s 
prior beliefs about a claim of y= 0.5 x 10-3. 
2.3  Result when the expert believes it is possible that there are no faults 
A problem with the previous result is that no matter how much evidence of perfect 
working the expert sees, his worst case probability of failure for a randomly selected 
demand cannot be better than y: it is easy to see that the expression h(z) in (6) goes to y as 
n goes to infinity.  
The reason lies in the extreme conservatism of placing all the expert’s belief about the 
pfd taking values to the left of y exactly at y. As n increases the expert’s beliefs change as 
a result of two effects: the second point of support for the expert’s conservative belief, z, 
moves to the left; and the probability mass at y increases (with a corresponding reduction 
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of the mass at z). In the limit all the mass is concentrated at y, but there is still no 
probability mass to the left of y. 
A real expert might regard this result as too conservative: most of us would regard very 
many failure-free demands to be evidence of very low probability of failure on demand. 
We might believe that any probability of failure for a randomly selected demand, 
however small, could be accepted if a sufficiently large number of failure-free demands 
had been seen.6 
As we shall see below, one way this can happen is the situation in which the expert is 
prepared to believe a priori in the possibility that the system is completely fault-free, 
however small his prior probability for this. 
We proceed by modifying the previous expressions for the expert’s prior beliefs as 
follows. The expert now believes, before seeing any evidence from the working system: 
• Prob(P=0)=α 
• For p>0, the expert’s beliefs are represented by an improper probability density 
function f(p).7 As before he is only willing (or able) to tell us one point on this 
distribution: Prob(P≤y|P>0)=1-x-α. 
This formulation retains the former belief that Prob(P≤y)=1-x, thus allowing a 
comparison with the earlier results. 
The most pessimistic prior satisfying the expert’s beliefs is now the one where 
(generalizing the right hand distribution in Figure 1) all the probability mass is 
concentrated at three points: 
• Prob(P=0)=α 
• Prob(P=y)= 1−x−α 
• Prob(P=1)= x 
From this pessimistic prior we have:  
! 
Prob(failure on randomly selected demand) = p. f (p)dp
0
1
"
< x + y# xy#$y = y**
    (8)  
cf. (3). Once again, the expert can treat y** as the true probability of failure on demand – 
for example in a wider safety case – and be assured that this is a conservative number. As 
before, this bound, based solely on prior beliefs, is very conservative, so it is again 
interesting to see what happens when n failure-free demands have been seen. 
The expert’s posterior beliefs are a mixed distribution again, with some probability mass 
at the origin, and an improper continuous probability density function when p>0: 
                                                
6 Assuming, of course, that the oracle can be trusted completely, and the operational profile accurately represents real 
use. 
7 That is 
! 
f (p)dp =1"#
0
1
$ . 
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! 
p0 (n) " Prob(P = 0 | n failure - free demands) =
Prob(n failure - free demands and P = 0)
Prob(n failure - free demands)
 
! 
=
"
(1# p)n f (p)dp
0
1
$ +"
        (9) 
and 
! 
f (p | n failure - free demands) =
(1" p)n f (p)
(1" p)n f (p)dp
0
1
# +$
,   p > 0    (10) 
Again this is an improper density function – it does not integrate to unity. Instead 
! 
f (p | n failure - free demands)dp =1"Prob(P = 0 | n failure - free demands)
0
1
#  
The expert’s posterior probability of failure on demand is: 
 
! 
Prob(system fails on randomly selected demand | n failure - free demands)  
! 
=
p
0
1
" (1# p)n f (p)dp
(1# p)n f (p)dp+$
0
1
"
        (11) 
As before, it can be shown that the most pessimistic improper density, f(p), is a 2-point 
distribution having probability mass (1-x-α) concentrated at y and probability mass x 
concentrated at z, where the value of z is chosen to maximise the posterior mean of p, 
which is, by substitution in (11): 
! 
y(1" y)
n
(1" x "#)+ z(1" z)n x
(1" y)
n
(1" x "#)+ (1" z)n x +#
       (12) 
 
The conservative posterior probability that the system is fault free is obtained by 
substituting the most pessimistic prior f(p) into the expression (9): 
! 
p0 (n) =
"
(1# y)
n
(1# x #")+ (1# z)n x +"
       (13) 
It is easy to see that this increases as n increases, and 
! 
p0 (n)"1 as n"# . Thus 
confidence in fault-freeness can be made arbitrarily close to certainty by the observation 
of a sufficiently large number of failure-free demands, however small the expert’s a 
priori confidence in fault-freeness. 
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As before 
! 
z" y as n"#. Tables 2, 3 and 4 give some feel for the way in which 
posterior beliefs – both for the ‘plug-in’ probability of failure on a randomly selected 
demand, and for the probability of fault-freeness – depend upon the prior beliefs, and 
upon the amount of failure-free working that has been seen. 
For example, in all cases here the expert will be able to treat the original claim – 0.0005 – 
as true after only a modest number of failure-free demands. He will be able to treat as 
true, a claim that is an order of magnitude better than this if he has strong enough a priori 
belief in perfection (α=0.9  in Table 3). Whilst such a belief might seem unreasonably 
strong, it should be remembered that all these results correspond to the same prior belief, 
! 
Prob(P " y) =1# x : they differ only in how this is partitioned into beliefs about P=0 and 
0<P≤y. 
 
 
          (1-x) 
n 
0.90 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.95 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.99 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0 0.1004          0.1 0.050425         0.1 0.010445 0.1 
1 0.026767         0.105456 0.013264         0.102644 0.002961 0.100549 
5 0.007571         0.106759 0.003899        0.103350 0.001123 0.100830 
10 0.004180         0.107183 0.002255                 0.103669 0.000802 0.101073 
30 0.001731         0.108274 0.001069         0.104663 0.000570 0.101997 
50 0.001221         0.109266 0.000822         0.105615 0.000521        0.102919 
100 0.000833 0.111733 0.000634 0.108005 0.000484 0.105251 
500 0.000498 0.135607 0.000467 0.129948 0.000443 0.125860 
1000 0.000441 0.168920 0.000433 0.161356 0.000423 0.154890 
 
Table 2 Examples of the worst case true probabilities of failure, based on an expert’s 
prior beliefs about a claim of y= 0.5 x 10-3, with α=0.1. Here, “Mean” is the worst case 
probability of failure on demand that the expert can treat as true; “p0(n)” is the expert’s 
posterior probability that the system is fault-free. The numbers below the horizontal line 
in the table correspond to means that are smaller than the original claim of y= 0.5 x 10-3, 
i.e. the expert can treat this conservatively as true. 
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          (1-x) 
n 
0.90 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.95 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.99 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0 0.1002 0.5 0.050225         0.5 0.010245 0.5 
1 0.026550 0.527163 0.013056         0.513111 0.002759 0.502643 
5 0.007350         0.533201 0.003689         0.516208 0.000921 0.503638 
10 0.003958         0.534725 0.002044                 0.517255 0.000599 0.504344 
30 0.001508         0.537761 0.000858         0.52001 0.000367 0.506893 
50 0.000997         0.540268 0.000610         0.522518 0.000318         0.509396 
100 0.000607 0.546281 0.000420 0.528668 0.000278 0.515627 
500 0.000256 0.605383 0.000238 0.583725 0.000222 0.566232 
1000 0.000186 0.667187 0.000189 0.643364 0.000189 0.622626 
 
Table 3. As Table 2, but with  α=0.5. 
 
 
          (1-x) 
n 
0.90 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.95 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0.99 
Mean 
  
p0(n) 
0 0.1 0.9 0.050025         0.9 0.010045 0.9 
1 0.026334 0.948683 0.012849         0.923405 0.002558 0.904575 
5 0.007129         0.958696 0.003479         0.928197 0.000719 0.905633 
10 0.003737         0.960371 0.001834                 0.929102 0.000398 0.905988 
30 0.001288         0.961564 0.000649         0.930145 0.000166 0.906910 
50 0.000778         0.961811 0.000402         0.930741 0.000118         0.907742 
100 0.000391 0.961998 0.000214 0.932010 0.000080 0.909755 
500 0.000079 0.962148 0.000051 0.950834 0.000042 0.926374 
1000 0.000039 0.962167 0.000027 0.962996 0.000032 0.937030 
 
Table 4. As Tables 2, 3, but with  α=0.9. Note that the result in the first two columns 
corresponds to 1-x=α=0.9. In this case the expert’s prior beliefs have no probability 
density between 0 and y, so the most pessimistic prior has probability mass on only two 
points, Prob(P=0)= 0.9 and Prob(P=1)=0.1, so that the a priori mean is 0.1 as shown in 
the first cell. The higher horizontal lines here are as in the previous figures. Beneath the 
lower horizontal lines, the expert can conservatively treat as true a claim that the pfd is no 
worse than 0.5 x 10-4, i.e. an order of magnitude better than the original claim (about 
which he had a priori doubt). 
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3 Discussion 
We have provided a formalism to support the kind of argument that has sometimes been 
used informally in real safety cases. That is, an expert can treat a claim about probability 
of failure on demand as true if he has sufficient confidence – albeit not certainty – in the 
truth of a stronger claim; and he can be sure that this ‘modest’ claim will be conservative. 
The value of such an approach, of course, is that this conservative pfd value can simply 
be ‘plugged in’ to a wider safety case, and the expert can know that the effect on any 
claims made at this higher level will be conservative.  
Not surprisingly, when based upon a priori beliefs alone, such an approach is very 
conservative; in fact it is too conservative to have practical usefulness. But when the 
expert begins to see evidence of failure-free working, this conservatism lessens, and it 
seems that the results can be useful.  
However, as we note, the conservative claim is bounded by the value of y in the expert’s 
original statement of belief, (y, x). Even with extensive evidence of perfect working, the 
best that can be claimed is y. It seems reasonable that a real expert would – at least after 
the fact, when confronted with extensive successful operation – find that this did not 
represent his expectations. Rather, most experts, we believe, would come to believe that 
the pfd is smaller than any y* for sufficiently large n, i.e. 
! 
y*" 0  as 
! 
n"#.  
The reason for the extreme conservatism is that we place all the probability mass lying to 
the left of y in the expert’s a priori distribution f(p) upon the point y itself. The expert has 
said initially “all I can tell you about my prior beliefs is that the chance of the pfd being 
smaller than y is 1-x.” In fact, if specifically questioned about it, it is likely that he would 
be prepared to say something further along the lines of: “I cannot tell you anything 
further in detail about how my beliefs are distributed in the interval (0, y), except that f(p) 
is not zero at any point in this interval.” In other words, our conservatism is too 
conservative to represent his beliefs about the pfd in the interval (0, y). 
Of course, this extreme conservatism places a serious constraint on the usefulness of the 
results here. Imagine that, for a wider safety case, we need to claim a pfd no worse than 
y* for the system under examination, and that y*<y. No matter how much evidence of 
successful operation he collects, the expert will not be able to make the y* claim unless 
he is prepared to expand his expressed a priori beliefs beyond the (y, x) used in our 
analysis.  
A theoretical way forward is for the expert to give a second point on the distribution of 
his prior belief distribution, f(p) – say (y**, x**), where y**<y* – essentially expressing 
belief about the interval (0, y) similarly to his earlier expression of belief about (0, 1). It is 
then easy to extend the results in the earlier part of the paper to show that as the number 
of failure-free demands, n, increases, the conservative claim approaches the bound y**. 
That is, for a sufficiently large n, the expert will be able to claim the required y* (>y**). 
The difficulty with this approach, of course, is that the expert has to be able to tell us his 
belief, expressed as a probability, that the pfd is smaller than y** – i.e. he has to be able 
to quantify a very small confidence, 1-x**. It is well-known that experts are very poor at 
estimating the extreme tails of probability distributions.  
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Notice how the reasoning required here contrasts with that involved in the analysis of 
section 2.3. Here the expert believes there is probability mass at the origin, and so is 
expressing a belief about perfection. He might plausibly reason something like this: “This 
system has very simple functionality, it has been designed very simply, and I have 
evidence of certain kinds of formal verification of its correctness, so I think there is a 
chance that they got it completely right.” This is very different from reasoning that “I 
know this system is too complex to be correct, so I know it will eventually fail in 
operation, but I am reasonably confident that the pfd is extremely small.” The two 
statements are very different in kind, and support for them comes from very different 
evidence. We think that real experts would be more comfortable with the former than 
with the latter. 
The work reported here represents only the beginnings of a practical probabilistic 
calculus of confidence for dependability cases – clearly much further work is needed. The 
problems are both theoretical and practical. Theoretical issues concern the representation 
and propagation of confidence through complex cases, which typically involve many 
disparate sources of doubt. Practical issues concern doing this with different, often 
incomplete, evidence sources. 
For example, in this paper we have only considered the situation in which interest centres 
upon the probability of failure on a randomly selected demand. Imagine, instead, we were 
interested in the probability of surviving m future demands (say, the number of demands 
expected in the system’s lifetime). It would be incorrect simply to use the conservative 
bound, say y*, obtained as above, and estimate this probability using (1-y*)m. Instead, we 
would need to find the prior that produces the most conservative value of 
! 
E((1" P)
m
) . 
Similar comments apply to other dependability measures: the point here is that a prior 
that is conservative for one measure will not generally be conservative for another. 
Other issues and questions for future study include the following: 
• Does the approach generalize to claims based on continuous measures, e.g. failure 
rates? 
• Can the results be generalized to the multi-attribute case, where claims concern 
more than one measure, e.g. (pfd, availability)? 
• Can other kinds of evidence, of the kinds available for realistic safety cases, be 
used in this kind of analysis? 
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Appendix
Statement
Let P be the system pfd treated as a random variable with density f(p).
Here we show that
E(P | n failure free demands) = 1−
∫ 1
0 (1− p)n+1f(p)dp∫ 1
0 (1− p)nf(p)dp
≤ (1)
1− (1− p1)
n+1(1− x) + (1− p2)n+1x
(1− p1)n(1− x) + (1− p2)nx
where
0 ≤ p1 ≤ y ≤ p2 ≤ 1∫ y
0
f(p)dp = 1− x.
and the bound (1) is reached with the two-point prior probability distribution
of P :
Prob(P = p1) = 1− x;
Prob(P = p2) = x;
Lemma
If q is a positive random variable and n is a positive integer, then
[E(qn+1)]
1
n+1 ≥ [E(qn)] 1n
Proof
If x ≥ 0 and a ≥ 1 the function f(x) = xa is convex, so, by Jensen’s inequality
E(xa) ≥ (E(x))a (2)
1
Substituting x = qn and a = n+1
n
into (2):
E(qn+1) ≥ [E(qn)]n+1n
which implies
[E(qn+1)]
1
n+1 ≥ [E(qn)] 1n
QED
Proof of the statement
Let us introduce four (unknown) values p1, p2, p3, p4
p1 = 1−
(∫ y
0 (1− p)n+1f(p)dp
1− x
) 1
n+1
p2 = 1−
(∫ 1
y (1− p)n+1f(p)dp
x
) 1
n+1
p3 = 1−
(∫ y
0 (1− p)nf(p)dp
1− x
) 1
n
p4 = 1−
(∫ 1
y (1− p)nf(p)dp
x
) 1
n
Obviously,
0 ≤ p1, p3 ≤ y
y ≤ p2, p4 ≤ 1
In accordance with the lemma
p1 ≤ p3 (3)
p2 ≤ p4 (4)
because
1− p1 = (E((1− P )n+1 | P ≤ y)) 1n+1
1− p3 = (E((1− P )n | P ≤ y)) 1n
1− p2 = (E((1− P )n+1 | P > y)) 1n+1
1− p4 = (E((1− P )n | P > y)) 1n
2
We can now use the values p1, p2, p3, p4 to write down an expression for
E(P | n successful runs)
E(P | n successful runs) = 1−
∫ 1
0 (1− p)n+1f(p)dp∫ 1
0 (1− p)nf(p)dp
= (5)
1−
∫ y
0 (1− p)n+1f(p)dp+
∫ 1
y (1− p)n+1f(p)dp∫ y
0 (1− p)nf(p)dp+
∫ 1
y (1− p)nf(p)dp
=
1− (1− p1)
n+1(1− x) + (1− p2)n+1x
(1− p3)n(1− x) + (1− p4)nx
Applying (3) and (4) to (5), we finally obtain the following upper bound
E(P | n successful runs) ≤ 1− (1− p1)
n+1(1− x) + (1− p2)n+1x
(1− p1)n(1− x) + (1− p2)nx (6)
and the bound (6) is obviously reached when one chooses the two-point prior
distribution of P :
Prob(P = p1) = 1− x; (7)
Prob(P = p2) = x;
0 ≤ p1 ≤ y ≤ p2 ≤ 1.
QED
Comment
The unknown values p1 and p2 are found as a solution of two-dimensional
optimisation problem
(1− p1)n+1(1− x) + (1− p2)n+1x
(1− p1)n(1− x) + (1− p2)nx → min (8)
subject to constraints:
0 ≤ p1 ≤ y;
y ≤ p2 ≤ 1.
In general, p1 and p2 may differ from y and 1.
3
